36C3 - Boeing 737MAX: Automated Crashes

1 451 Weergaven 150K

media.ccc.de/v/36c3-10961-boeing_737max_automated_crashes
Underestimating the dangers of designing a protection system
Everybody knows about the Boeing 737 MAX crashes and the type's continued grounding. I will try to give some technical background information on the causes of the crash, technical, sociological and organisational, covering pilot proficiency, botched maintenance, system design and risk assessment, as well as a deeply flawed certification processes.
On the surface of it, the accidents to two aircraft of the same type (Boeing 737 MAX), which eventually led to the suspension of airworthiness of the type, was caused by faulty data from one of the angle-of-attack sensors. This in turn led to automatic nose-down trim movements, which could not be countered effectively by the flight crew. Eventually, in both cases, the aircraft became uncontrollable and entered a steep accelerated dive into terrain, killing all people on board on impact.
In the course of the investigation, a new type of flight assistance system known as the Maneuvering Characteristics Augmentation System (MCAS) came to light. It was intended to bring the flight characteristics of the latest (and fourth) generation of Boeing's best-selling 737 airliner, the "MAX", in line with certification criteria. The issue that the system was designed to address was relatively mild. A little software routine was added to an existing computer to add nose-down trim in situations of higher angles of attack, to counteract the nose-up aerodynamic moment of the new, much larger, and forward-mounted engine nacelles.
Apparently the risk assessment for this system was not commensurate with its possible effects on aircraft behaviour and subsequently a very odd (to a safety engineer's eyes) system design was chosen, using a single non-redundant sensor input to initiate movement of the horizontal stabiliser, the largest and most powerful flight control surface. At extreme deflections, the effects of this flight control surface cannot be overcome by the primary flight controls (elevators) or the manual actuation of the trim system. In consequence, the aircraft enters an accelerated nose-down dive, which further increases the control forces required to overcome its effects.
Finally I will take a look at certification processes where a large part of the work and evaluation is not performed by an independent authority (FAA, EASA, ...) but by the manufacturer, and in many cases is then simply signed off by the certification authority. In a deviation from common practice in the past, EASA has announced that it may not follow the FAA (re-) certification, but will require additional analyses and evidence. China, which was the first country to ground the "MAX", will also not simply adopt the FAA paperwork.
Bernd Sieker
fahrplan.events.ccc.de/congress/2019/Fahrplan/events/10961.html

Reacties

  1. Jeanette Bujold
    Jeanette Bujold
    3 maanden geleden

    Not impressed by your presentation. The showing of Mentor Pilot video lacked veracity. You failed to mention by ignorance or malfeasance that the difficulty in manually triming the plane was at cruise speed. At low speed it is easy to do. Therefore is immaterial to the issue at hand. Wish i could cross examine you. I am an Aviation Trail Lawyer and hold a CPL. So sad.

  2. nailit orglondon
    nailit orglondon
    3 maanden geleden

    So they rather care about pushing this crap through the paper work rather than build good aircraft and get it certified accordingly. Ooooh, money money money too much money. Was it cheaper this grounded action? Reverse engineering never pays you a bill.

  3. Jeanette Bujold
    Jeanette Bujold
    3 maanden geleden

    Now all problems are fixed. Most scrutinized plane

    1. nailit orglondon
      nailit orglondon
      3 maanden geleden

      Of you go.

  4. Randy 747
    Randy 747
    3 maanden geleden

    Very interesting lecture! When will those responsible (plural) be held accountable? The board of directors of Boeing was left with a nice severance payment. But that does not help the many dead. In addition, in my eyes the whole thing is more than a criminal because you tried to cover up everything up to the last!

  5. Nick V
    Nick V
    5 maanden geleden

    Congrats to Boeing. They automated 9/11.

  6. Victor Palamar
    Victor Palamar
    9 maanden geleden

    It might be an good idea for the Copilot to visually inspect flight control testing on the ground in the start-up/run-up sequence to ENSURE controls are functioning correctly, eg AOA sensors are working!

  7. Shabazza84
    Shabazza84
    11 maanden geleden

    16:00 So basically: Out of greed, they "fixed" a newly introduced aerodynamic design problem with software (that virtually no pilot knew about). And it got certified without having a proper/unambiguous signalling for the pilots about what the system is doing and why. Yeah, in a B737, you can see the trim wheels move. But you still don't know WHY they move, nor do you know, that a manual correction would only have temporary effect, until the system re-engages. So I'd say: The FMEA on this new system was clearly insufficient and in favour of validating this new design. As was the documentation and (as we know today: the training) I hope this is a good example for other companies to really think about a proper solution for a design problem, instead of "patching" it in the wrong realm. (my own company included) FAA can help you only that much. If your solution is flawed, but sufficiently documented for the certification, there is nothing they can do to prevent you from messing up. EDIT: 26:20 Wait...if it's "just" MAJOR, you don't need an FMEA at all? Wait, WUT?

  8. chris terry
    chris terry
    Jaar geleden

    One thing I can’t figure out is the electric trim buttons on the yoke. Does MCAS override the inputs or do the buttons(nose up) override MCAS? In theory couldn’t you use the buttons to level the aircraft and then deactivate the stab trim? I think Boeing should consider changing their design of the stick shaker. How could anyone concentrate and be effective with a giant jack hammer on your lap and the plane is nose diving. I had to take a Xanax just thinking about it!

  9. Andy Hall
    Andy Hall
    Jaar geleden

    Airbus has crashed two plane loads of people due to the side sticks canceling each other out. Yet they didn't ground them.

  10. Andy Hall
    Andy Hall
    Jaar geleden

    Bad look for Boeing, but experienced pilots would have been fine. These failures have happened at Southwest Airlines and American Airlines..... and... no crashes.

  11. Dortia Pewpew
    Dortia Pewpew
    Jaar geleden

    This was a terrible talk but in structure and substance.

  12. Ah Mo
    Ah Mo
    Jaar geleden

    Possible solution for B737MAX watch the video below nllike.info/baby/video/qpNjuH21raaf1HI

  13. mark parrott
    mark parrott
    Jaar geleden

    If you can't even get the correct drawing of a 737Max (the one you show is an Airbus A320), how do expect us to give credibility to anything you say ?

  14. John Cage
    John Cage
    Jaar geleden

    A good example for a catastrophic requirements analysis failure. 1. when there are n sensors for delivering data, that redundancy certainly has a reason, so just taking input from one is just gross negligence, 2. you should never design a system, so that it continuously counteracts what the pilot obviously wants to achieve, 3. if you design a potentially fatal piece of flight control you should really consider giving the pilot the chance to switch it off (and documented how to), in case it does strange stuff. - We're talking about very well trained pilots here, that learned how to fly these planes. You're not supposed to design systems, that work against that! (This is very different from a car's driver assistance system, where the average driver's driving training is minimal and emergency case training is zero.)

  15. kofferfischii
    kofferfischii
    Jaar geleden

    Aerodynamics. Just look at it. It has no balance.

    1. Appable
      Appable
      Jaar geleden

      None of those sentences constitute engineering assessment. "It has no balance" is a meaningless assertion; the Beluga XL and Dreamlifter look like they have no balance and yet they're reliable aircraft for their purpose. Aerodynamics is pointless, and besides 737 MAX is far better aerodynamically (that's why it performs better than 737 NG, or at least would perform better if it actually flew).

  16. Kestrel
    Kestrel
    Jaar geleden

    Great talk!

  17. Soundfilet
    Soundfilet
    Jaar geleden

    Ja???

  18. 9243672946729
    9243672946729
    Jaar geleden

    Ja die manager wieder, nun bringen die auch noch leute um durch ihre fahrlässige handlungsweise.

  19. Forever Pink F.
    Forever Pink F.
    Jaar geleden

    Money makes the world go round...

  20. Alexander LegisNonScriptae
    Alexander LegisNonScriptae
    Jaar geleden

    29:00 I am doing my best to trim the yoke but it's not working. Going now to find another egg

  21. Alexander LegisNonScriptae
    Alexander LegisNonScriptae
    Jaar geleden

    12:41 Uncommanded nose-down trim. Several ladies have complimented me on that

    1. Brawlin Harry
      Brawlin Harry
      5 maanden geleden

      that joke is in poor taste. also: r/thathappened

  22. akronymus
    akronymus
    Jaar geleden

    Complete rubbish. Yes, Boeing cheated the FAA. Nut both crews didn't do the stabilizer runaway procedure which would have stopped the disaster. Watch 'Mentour' for explanation.

  23. Joe from Berlin
    Joe from Berlin
    Jaar geleden

    Is there any, just one single reason, to use just one of two sensors? Some People knew it, but the culture in the company, was prohibiting them to speak it out. It was a stupid mistake, it was not to save money on another sensor, it was just pure stupidity. If that kind of stupidy gets covered by a bad culture in a company, good night.

    1. Appable
      Appable
      Jaar geleden

      @Joe from Berlin One sensor was thought, based on a flawed safety analysis, to provide adequate redundancy. Implementing two sensors is challenging because each of the angle of attack sensors connects to a single computer - so the two computers each know of the existence of only one angle-of-attack sensor. MCAS was to be implemented with minimal changes to the wiring of sensors to computers, so implementing it on a single computer was much easier. I suspect they determined this implementation detail first and then asked for a safety analysis that confirmed that such an implementation was acceptable - which is the wrong way to do it for obvious reasons. Hope that helps?

    2. Joe from Berlin
      Joe from Berlin
      Jaar geleden

      @Soundfilet ?

    3. Soundfilet
      Soundfilet
      Jaar geleden

      Sänk ju tuh

  24. F. D.
    F. D.
    Jaar geleden

    In a way, the "super-efficiency" craze in the EU, fueled by irrational fears of an imminent "thermocalypse" and a failure of airline executives to understand the relationships of technological constraints lead to demands that were impossible to meet for the engineers - but manufacturers didn't dare to speak up. I wonder how many times this pattern will have to repeat itself before we, as a society learn, that those politicians and "activists" who fear existing technology because they lack the understanding of the underlying scientific principles, and therefore "bless" us with irrational demands/ technology roadmaps can and should be ignored, as their ivory tower "solutions" are essentially solipsistic non-solutions to non-issues.

    1. RZU 147
      RZU 147
      Jaar geleden

      Moron. Fuel IS EXPENSIVE Climate yes or no doesnt matter.

  25. Dingus Doofus
    Dingus Doofus
    Jaar geleden

    The original version had no checks? Problems were inevitable. I know this, you know this, they knew this. They murdered hundreds of people out of hunger of money. AND THEY DIND'T DOCUMENT THE WAY IT IS AFFECTED BY PILOT INPUT SO THE PILOT KNOW S WHAT TO DO?????? WTF Was this done on purpose?! Sabotage by a disgruntled psychopathic engineer? THe new certification management is a horrible design as well. Holy shit. This is what corporatist feudalism (otherwise misnomed as neoliberalism) does to the world. If the investigaiton on this doesn't lead to several incarcerations and crippling fines then you know the system is completely broken. If the airplane thinks you're stalling while you know you aren't you sohuld immediately recognise the software is broken and a liability. What were they thinking? They killed themselves with their bad decision making and hundreds other people too. Poor devils.

  26. Inception1338
    Inception1338
    Jaar geleden

    Scence from fightclub on american insurance companies are missing here. nllike.info/baby/video/hJp0mn25goB9zXY "Ford Pinto" case. They didn't recall the cars to fit a $13 safety plate to protect the gass tank from rear end collisions.

  27. Ulrich Kälber
    Ulrich Kälber
    Jaar geleden

    i see a reason to use only one sensor as a reference for the System: the program was added on an already exsisting Computer. maybe the programmer feared that a more complex program might either not fit into the Memory, or would use up to much compute power instead of asking at what Level the sensor reading is the program would have to read two values, compare them and then decide what value to trust, this would mean to take into account and interprete the values of other sensors. this in a Situation in wich there might already be an emergency(imminent stall). in thoery that might cause a delay of the correct decision…. instead it was programmed to guarrantee the catastrophic decision.

    1. Appable
      Appable
      Jaar geleden

      Correct. MCAS was built directly on top of the STS software, which was also single-channel.

  28. pseudaeles
    pseudaeles
    Jaar geleden

    its all about the money baby.

  29. Knee Snap
    Knee Snap
    Jaar geleden

    I was on a plane that had the hydrolics fail in the air. I think I'm pretty impressed humanity has managed to get something like airlines so well done. We've shown our incompetence at virtually everything, but somehow, we manage to get airplanes to work reliably. The disaster of the 737MAX is bad, but overall I'm surprised how safe aviation is in general. It's a real testament to what we can do.

  30. Jeebus
    Jeebus
    Jaar geleden

    Wow, surprising good presentation and great Q&A! An FMEA should certainly have been done for this system and probably would have resulted in more scrutiny, as mentioned the engineering was probably rushed. ~47 i've seen mention that it was used on the 757, and also that it may intentionally have used only one sensor in order to avoid FAA scrutiny...

  31. Eugene Krabs
    Eugene Krabs
    Jaar geleden

    I read years ago about fly-by-wire technology and as a software engineer I was instantly reluctant. Everybody working in that field knows that it's nearly impossible to create non-trivial software which is under guarantee free from design- and implementation flaws. From time to time you'll have that "Oops! We would never have thought of THAT case"-moment. And software does not start at that high level of an MCAS implementation. It starts at the firmware of the fucking microchips of which such systems are composed. The possibilities for failures are endless and are increasing with the complexity. Let alone that a lot of incompetent developers are out there. With more automation there are definitely more crashes to come.

    1. Appable
      Appable
      2 maanden geleden

      @Eugene Krabs No, fly-by-wire and augmentation systems are distinct concepts. Fly-by-wire does allow more advanced control law (which might have helped significantly in designing a safe MCAS); the fact that 737 is not fly-by-wire limited MCAS's design.

    2. Eugene Krabs
      Eugene Krabs
      2 maanden geleden

      ​@Appable It would not be possible without fly-by-wire to have a computer take over the flight controls.

    3. Appable
      Appable
      Jaar geleden

      MCAS is not fly-by-wire technology. Aircraft with fly-by-wire technology have drastically reduced crashes.

    4. JohnnyBoythePilot
      JohnnyBoythePilot
      Jaar geleden

      Nearly every new modern airliner at this point features fly-by-wire/computer-augmented controls & automation, from the Cseries to the A380.

    5. Forever Pink F.
      Forever Pink F.
      Jaar geleden

      Ka Ko very true!

  32. Scott Myers
    Scott Myers
    Jaar geleden

    Idiots took control from the pilot...

  33. LEJ.approach
    LEJ.approach
    Jaar geleden

    Extremely interesting stuff! Thanks a lot for publishing!

  34. JonKess
    JonKess
    Jaar geleden

    The A320 has more orders than the 737...... 15156 orders of the 737 and 15315 orders of the A320

  35. Alex Abrikosov
    Alex Abrikosov
    Jaar geleden

    Do Germans find it awesome that the airplane safety expert's name sounds like Bernd Sicher?

    1. Sebastian Labusch
      Sebastian Labusch
      Jaar geleden

      In my native Accent (from western Germany), "Sieker" and "sicher" actually sound quite different.

  36. MyTech
    MyTech
    Jaar geleden

    Not to excuse Boeing's poor implementation of MCAS,(nor the poor handling of re-certification by management) but this was a case of everyone being wrong. More generally there is a huge difference in the career paths, initial and recurrent training of pilots in those regions of the world as compared to the USA, not to mention company autopilot policies that tend to atrophy pilot skills. Neither the LionAir nor the Ethiopian crews followed what are considered basic emergency procedures in the USA. The LionAir plane was not airworthy at the time of departure according to first world standards, that much was clear from investigation reports. Also Boeing sends notices to these third world airlines on a regular basis informing them that they are not performing proper maintenance or properly training crews and these airlines ignore the notices. LionAir for one has never made any correction to its unsafe operation practices, simply because they have never admitted fault for any incident and so claim there is nothing to fix. It is not coincidence that there have been none of these issues with the MAX on US based airlines despite most of the MAX flight hours to date being in the USA. And its worth a note that the grounding was initiated by China, which is in a trade dispute with the USA(and has several airbus factories), followed by the EU which has historically seized every opportunity to give advantage to Airbus.(not limited to ignoring the huge safety flaw in the Airbus side-stick cockpit design, even after crashes significant enough to be used as case studies for pilot training in the USA)

    1. Paul
      Paul
      Jaar geleden

      Never heard such racist twaddle in all my life. This is the attitude of Boeing to requests made by Lion Air for training BEFORE delivery; _“Now friggin Lion Air might need a sim to fly the MAX, and maybe because of their own stupidity. I’m scrambling trying to figure out how to unscrew this now! idiots,”_ and _“I am concerned that if [redacted] chooses to require a Max simulator for its pilots beyond what all other regulators are requiring that it will be creating a difficult and unnecessary training burden for your airline, as well as potentially establish a precedent in your region for other Max customers.”_ onemileatatime.com/boeing-737-max-lion-air-simulator/

    2. MyTech
      MyTech
      Jaar geleden

      It should also be noted that the Mentour simulator demonstration was not following Boeing manual trim procedure which involves briefly reliving back pressure so that the copilot can get in a few spins and then reapplying back pressure to regain level flight and reduce speed, repeating this cycle as needed.(each cycle gets easier as trim advances) Also electric trim was not broken and could have been used before turning off the trim motor. As for Ethiopian the pilots kept full takeoff power the entire flight which any pilot with proper training knows will increase pressure on controls, not to mention slowing down increases the time avalible to troubleshoot as well as reducing vertical speed at any given pitch attitude.

  37. Sascha Haupt
    Sascha Haupt
    Jaar geleden

    The presentation described very good what went wrong with the MAX. However, there is one issue that shows a fundamental misunderstanding of aviation engineering (mostly in the Q&A part). DO-178 Software Considerations in Airborne Systems and Equipment Certification and SW testing were discussed a lot. However, the software implementation was NOT the problem . It worked as designed. The things went wrong in the preceding systems engineering phase when the requirements for MCAS were defined. So, more an issue of ARP4754 and ARP4761. Why is this important? Well, because SW tests just show if the SW behavior is in line with SW requirements. Thus, better SW development processes or more SW testing would not have fixed the broken system design. Btw. that is not just an aviation issue. Also other (software) systems suffer from insufficient requirements engineering and requirements validation.

  38. Stephen46 xre
    Stephen46 xre
    Jaar geleden

    *Yesterday we learned something new about the safety culture at Boeing:* www.aerotime.aero/aerotime.team/24445-faa-wants-to-fine-boeing-5-4m-for-slat-tracks-on-737max "Boeing had submitted approximately 178 Boeing 737 MAX aircraft for certification, knowing that the aircraft were installed with nonconforming slat tracks" …. *"To make matters even worse, the authority believes Boeing did that on purpose".* Anybody who still has confidence in Boeing should think about it.

  39. Matthias Wewering
    Matthias Wewering
    Jaar geleden

    TED Beta 0.8

  40. Ten Minute Tokyo 2
    Ten Minute Tokyo 2
    Jaar geleden

    Outsourced to India Inc HCL jackasses for $9/hr. What the hell did you expect to happen?

  41. New Balance 2019 USA
    New Balance 2019 USA
    Jaar geleden

    The engineer and developer of the MCAS should be revealed, so that public can bash him or them! I suggest by hitting them with tennisballs on a fair, funfair or amusement park. Who has most Hits wins.

  42. zapfanzapfan
    zapfanzapfan
    Jaar geleden

    That simulator video by Mentor was properly scary.

  43. boeingdriver29
    boeingdriver29
    Jaar geleden

    I was distracted by kids whilst watching this but a question I have is can the MCAS override the stab trim cutout switches? i.e. if the stab trim cutout switches are moved to cutout by the crew does this completely disable MCAS. If it does I struggle to understand why both crews on the crash aircraft failed to do so treating the circumstances as per a runaway stab. That’s what I would have done in the same situation. Retired skipper B737/200/300/400/800.

    1. boeingdriver29
      boeingdriver29
      Jaar geleden

      Bob Evens sorry but I have to move on.

    2. boeingdriver29
      boeingdriver29
      Jaar geleden

      Bob Evens FYI I’m not directly blaming the pilots, they were dealing with a dire circumstance that they were neither trained in and had no knowledge of the system creating the problem. I blame Boeing for 1) creating a flight control system with zero redundancy and 2) not informing either the operators or the pilots of MCAS. I just know what I would have done.

    3. boeingdriver29
      boeingdriver29
      Jaar geleden

      Bob Evens you’re obviously not a pilot. Do you think in these circumstances with a 2 pilot crew their going to have time to dig in to the flight ops manual which is often stored behind the captains circuit breaker panel requiring a pilot to leave his seat ? The QRH is their guide via recall and reference items. All they needed to do was place the stab trim cutout’s to cutout when they noticed un-commanded (remembering they had no knowledge of MCAS) and inappropriate stab trim movement then one pilot flies whilst the other uses the manual trim wheel handles to re trim the stab.

    4. boeingdriver29
      boeingdriver29
      Jaar geleden

      Bob Evens what no response? Are you just another armchair expert commenting out of ignorance? I think so.

    5. boeingdriver29
      boeingdriver29
      Jaar geleden

      Bob Evens I don’t know what you’re talking about. Reducing airspeed was never on any Runaway Stab QRH checklist for the 737. The only changes to that checklist have been additions.

  44. Halfdan Ingolfsson
    Halfdan Ingolfsson
    Jaar geleden

    Boeing used to be the standard-bearer in design and safety. A couple of decades ago the money-mongers took control of Boeing and it is to the credit of the ingrained original safety culture at Boeing that it took them this long to run Boeing into the ground - which they still managed to do in the end.

  45. GhstWrtr
    GhstWrtr
    Jaar geleden

    They say safety regulations are written in blood. 346 people had theirs taken to underline them once again. May they rest in peace.

    1. Alexander LegisNonScriptae
      Alexander LegisNonScriptae
      Jaar geleden

      If God chooses to put the pieces together again

  46. james caley
    james caley
    Jaar geleden

    Regarding hazard analysis classification: catastrophic, major, minor etc. Normal engineering procedure is to start by assuming the worst case and then justify with data why it should be in a lower category. This is also how FMEAs work, i.e. if you don't know or don't have data you have to assume the worst case then get the data to prove otherwise. For example, if you didn't know the failure rate for AoA sensors you would have to assume failures would happen as a matter of routine. But if you had data to show the rate was 1 in a million that is what you would use (and there were reports failures of AoA sensors). An FMEA should be mandatory for this kind of change, not just the introduction of MCAS but separately for the later changes to MCAS which made it much more aggressive with greater deflection. For the root cause there is technical root causes, systemic root causes and then there is the culture. All 3 need to be considered.

  47. Sam Whitehead
    Sam Whitehead
    Jaar geleden

    This guy knows what he is talking about, But he has a as much charisma as watching paint Dry,

    1. Paul
      Paul
      Jaar geleden

      He's German, by their standards he is the life of the party!! (just kidding, love German people really)

    2. Narry
      Narry
      Jaar geleden

      Chris Richter Same. But funny comment nonetheless.

    3. Chris Richter
      Chris Richter
      Jaar geleden

      Can´t agree tbh. I liked listening.

    4. New Balance 2019 USA
      New Balance 2019 USA
      Jaar geleden

      Like a empty tin of Campell soup.

  48. C Wang
    C Wang
    Jaar geleden

    By raising level of redundancies 2+ level, probability of failure can be reduced to less than 10^ -14 . That is to say at a fail-proof state. Flight control system is so critical for modern, fly-by-wire airplanes , reduce probability of failure to less than current 10^-9 level is absolutely necessary.

    1. C Wang
      C Wang
      Jaar geleden

      Besides, when FAA made the probability of 10^-9 rule, extremely improbable, that was many years ago. Number of flights each day has grown exponentially making it necessary to further reducing the probability of failure to a fail-proof state, 10^-14. Another factor should be considered is the weather system in the future will be even more unstable due to climate changes, i.e. more thermally dynamic resulting increased mobility.

  49. LC Y
    LC Y
    Jaar geleden

    Could it be MCAS wiring to similar to “Electrical doors system” alike, just like old days electrical door popped open, and not autopilot that all mistaken in the first place based on maintenance’s sense of aircraft’s body maintenance certification ?

  50. 1337Jogi
    1337Jogi
    Jaar geleden

    If you ask me Boeing should not be allowed to build any aircraft without recertification of all of them. Boeing obviously is not fit to build safety critical equipment. They criminally ignored common sense, regulations and safety procedures out of greed. The FAA didnt care because MURRICA. If that accident had happened in the US. There would have been millions or billions in lawsuits and people would have gone into prison already. But its only others dying. Not so bad right? Better put VW engineers into prison who produced cheating software right? I work in the automotive industries and the regulations you have to follow regarding any safety critical equipment are very high. Also Sensor failure is like one of the first and most important things you pull into concideration when assessing a new system. You don't even want to know how many checks failsafe states are implemented for all software that directly influences a cars movement. Ignoring that problem is not a simple mistake. They knew it but they did not want to make it look like a big deal so they did not design a complex failsafe software. If they had the FAA would have realized that the MCAS is very much a critical component and the certification would have been harder. This is criminal activity right here.

  51. Michael Hall
    Michael Hall
    Jaar geleden

    Well delivered and comprehensive. Bravo.

  52. Shato Nyruami
    Shato Nyruami
    Jaar geleden

    What I would be interested in, and I couldn´t find this information anywhere, has there ever been criminal investigations conducted into that matter by the FBI or whoever concerns themselves. I cannot believe that there hasn´t been a single engineer warning about what could and eventually did happen during the design and/or testing phase. The excuse Boeing gave was essential that they didn´t know and they couldn´t have possibly known. If a criminal investigation produced proof that they not only could have known but actually DID know because there have been warnings from the engineers, the whole matter would gain a completely new dimension, also personally I would find it quite satisfying if Boeing executives, instead of still earning 7-digit salaries and cashing 8-digit bonuses, would have been thrown in jail for a few decades for manslaughter or at least 5-10 years for involuntary manslaughter. That would at least clearly have given a signal to other executives that it is their own lives they are gambling with when they decide to go the cheap route no matter what the consequences for others could be.

  53. Carsten Oepping
    Carsten Oepping
    Jaar geleden

    the reason that they use only one sensor is simple: they cannot use two , otherwise its not a "minor change" of the system and has to be extensively documented and testet (which is costly, delaying) in this case the safety rules makes the plane unsafe. if this rule was not in place, boeing could make use of both sensors which kept over 300 people alive.

    1. It's Me
      It's Me
      Jaar geleden

      Bullshit lol. Self certification is the problem

    2. New Balance 2019 USA
      New Balance 2019 USA
      Jaar geleden

      Boeing?

  54. Alastair Barkley
    Alastair Barkley
    Jaar geleden

    Lion Air correctly identified a AoA sensor problem the day before the crash. Mechanics replaced it. There is no proof either way whether they did it properly. The replacement sensor was not new, it was refurbished by an FAA certified US aero supplies company in Florida. The Indonesian TSB concluded the replacement sensor was FAULTY out of the box and this fault caused the crash Captain and First Officer to receive different AoA sensor readings at a crucial moment when they needed to be coordinating their response. Not only did the Florida company fail to follow FAA and Boeing mandated repair procedures, they even lacked the equipment necessary to properly calibrate the refurbished AoA sensor. This US company was stripped of FAA certification and has filed for Chapter 11. Remember this when you hear Boeing fanboys trumpeting about 'dumb foreigners'.

  55. Alastair Barkley
    Alastair Barkley
    Jaar geleden

    Keep up. World's best selling passenger airliner is the Airbus A-320. Overtook the 737 in December 2019.

  56. Jimmy Hage
    Jimmy Hage
    Jaar geleden

    I don't think the MAX should be allowed to fly again.It looks more like a case of deep corruption. One thing for sure I'm never boarding that flying coffin. A good step is that Europe will have its own certification procedures.

  57. Roxy Raccoon
    Roxy Raccoon
    Jaar geleden

    Boeing's MCAS had up to 2 Sensors and both a Warning Light AND Sound but to get all of it cost extra. That's right, a safety patch was treated as possible revenue.

    1. Roxy Raccoon
      Roxy Raccoon
      Jaar geleden

      And? This just in regarding Boeing employee emails nllike.info/baby/video/mX54un_OlpuHxGk

    2. Roxy Raccoon
      Roxy Raccoon
      Jaar geleden

      Alastair Barkley, Boeing was trying to avoid Pilot Recertification to get the Max sold instead of customers turning to Airbus. Boeing was purposely vague on the steps they took to avoid the 737 Max to climb at too steep an angle when applying high thrust. The MCAS system, created for this issue, was not part of the laptop orientation (orientation, not recertification) that Pilots received for the Max This and the FACT that any part of the safety system had varying levels of additional cost indicates, as I said, that safety was treated as potential additional revenue. MCAS nearly caused a 3rd accident during level flight which proves the vulnerability to failure. The MCAS software portion of the "solution" was complex enough and obviously not completely tested as to render the entire Max fleet unsafe. If the findings of both crashes and the near crash point to the AoA sensor(s) then the MCAS software should have interrogated other instruments to determine aircraft orientation. If the findings indicate that external MCAS AoA sensors were functioning normally, it was the internal portion, including the software that perhaps never was designed (and was therefore rushed into service) to account for stick pressure and (external to MCAS) flight data. The bean counters who chased revenue in lieu of safety may have bankrupted Boeing in the long term by making the decisions I have described above.

    3. Alastair Barkley
      Alastair Barkley
      Jaar geleden

      Boeing (and the FAA) are absolutely clear that the additional fault display was not a necessary feature. The aircraft can be flown safely without it. Absolutely clear on that. Only 20% of all purchasers went for the additional alert display. It's not as simple as you say. The additional display is STANDARD on the 737 NG series. The new 737 Max supplied flight control software was delivered unable to link with the AoA sensors fitted. The 'upgrade' you can buy is not new software or warning lights, it's NEW AoA sensors.

  58. GaryL3803
    GaryL3803
    Jaar geleden

    Let's regress to 1988 and the Airbus A320 "maiden flight", a demonstration flight with 2 A320 instructor pilots aboard. Crashed into trees at the end of the runway because the pilots could not override the the automated FMS and perform a simple "go around". This leaves us 31 years later with 4 pilots crashing 2 new airplanes because there was no "revert to manual" controls to allow recovery after an AOA failure. AF 447, an A330, crashed into the Atlantic ocean when pitot tubes iced over and the pilots, dependent on automatic controls for most of their careers, stalled the aircraft at high altitude and refused to do the obvious - push the node down. Need to require all commercial pilots to execute recurring manual recovery procedures AND all FMS systems with an easy to find "OFF" switch. Makes me shiver to think I may on the highway with my family alongside self driving cars in the next decade or so.

    1. Fabian Böhm
      Fabian Böhm
      4 maanden geleden

      While GaryL makes a good point about "automation fatigue", both examples that he lists are crashes where automation and the FMS have not been recognized as a primary cause. For AF296, the captain performed an unsafe maneuver and was too late in applying go around thrust. The claim that this was caused by the FMS is highly disputed and not recognized by the official investigation. As for AF 447, the FMS was actually turned off in parts due to the incorrect air speed data. This allowed the co-pilot to deliberately stall the aircraft, which would not have been possible in the regular FMS flight envelope. Both of these crashes have been attributed to pilot error and would've been preventable through additional pilot training. While it is easy to point the finger at automation as a cause for aviation accidents, we also have to recognize that modern FMS have contributed significantly to the exponentially decreasing number of air crashes as well as to the cheap costs of flying today.

  59. 123Massel321
    123Massel321
    Jaar geleden

    @47:28: As far as I know, using MCAS with both sensors simultaneously for each flight, would have made MCAS more critical. Or in other words: With both sensors used simultaneously, it would have been harder to hide it from the FAA and thus, it would've been more likely that the FAA required additional pilot training. And even with two sensors: It may not be so easy, to determine, which the bad one is. Imaginary: FAA: Why is the MCAS rated as not so critical, when it's connected to both sensors simultaneously? Boeing: Oh come on! You know us! Saftey first! Just in Case! Dont Mind it! Look: theres a squirrel outside! FAA: o_Ó Boeing: :-o

    1. Nick V
      Nick V
      5 maanden geleden

      All that means is there should have been three AOA sensors just like there are three pitot tubes.

    2. JonKess
      JonKess
      Jaar geleden

      @MeatLeBeef Yes i would be safer, BUT it would require changes to manuals etc. which may prevent the MAX from being the same type certificate which by the way is the ONLY reason mcas was developed.

    3. MeatLeBeef
      MeatLeBeef
      Jaar geleden

      In the case of a big discrepancy, the MCAS could just turn a malfunction indicator lamp on and completely shut down - in this case it seems to really be the safest solution, comparing it to guessing which sensor is the good one and just correcting based off of that.

  60. 0cer0
    0cer0
    Jaar geleden

    How can a pilot fly a plane with this stick shaker rattling for an hour? Ghastly imagination. And then they leave it in service and fly it again?!

    1. Andrzej Sawicki
      Andrzej Sawicki
      10 maanden geleden

      It's fine. Every crash is an isolated incident. Pinky promise.

    2. Alexander LegisNonScriptae
      Alexander LegisNonScriptae
      Jaar geleden

      0cer0 , the longer your stick shakes the more your partner will like it

    3. Alexander LegisNonScriptae
      Alexander LegisNonScriptae
      Jaar geleden

      ​ C. Ö. , just because your mother says she wants a more immersive experience doesn't mean the rest of us do

    4. Alexander LegisNonScriptae
      Alexander LegisNonScriptae
      Jaar geleden

      My wife left me to go Indonesia. Jakarta? No, she took a plane

    5. C. Ö.
      C. Ö.
      Jaar geleden

      They probably thought it was a feature, just like the Playstation 4 Controller with its haptic feedback, making your experience more immersive, hahahhahaha.

  61. Miles's Bases Project
    Miles's Bases Project
    Jaar geleden

    The Public are not being told that the "secondary autopilot" is specifically designed so the Pentagon or "AN-other" can take control of an aircraft andc fly into ANYTHING (D'oH!) IT CANNOT BE OVERIDED BY THE Pilots no matter what they do

    1. András Dudás
      András Dudás
      Jaar geleden

      Feels better to turn it into a conspiracy theory, but it's worse, than that. It is the culture of greed, headless competition, and the ever demanded cost cuts and austerity, which is forced by the basic structural build up of the system, from both sides, private, and regulation.

  62. delija67717
    delija67717
    Jaar geleden

    Bottom line ,over 400 innocent people was killed by those profit greedy motherfuckers and no one from Boeing is in jail for life time for those murders . Sometimes maybe people should take justice in their hands.

  63. Patrick Ferrari
    Patrick Ferrari
    Jaar geleden

    He is just pointing for the superficial information released in regards to the two accidents. Few people mention that Lion Air Mechanics have wrongly repaired the AoA Sensor before the fatal flight; on Etiopian Air flight, the AoA was hit by an external object causing the malfunction. Also the MCAS relies on one AoA in the same way that the Autotrim relies in only one AoA since the beggin of the 737 project as well. Definetely there was an issue with the MAX but the media and "experts" are taking advantage to gain visibility over Boeing.

  64. Thyandyr
    Thyandyr
    Jaar geleden

    The software did what it was supposed to. It was the design that was wrong, due to cutting corners and misinterpreting the guidelines.

    1. Andrzej Sawicki
      Andrzej Sawicki
      10 maanden geleden

      @ped7g You assume it was a dev choice. More likely they made a prototype to test if it would work, maybe made it into beta , and that is what ended up in the production aircraft. After all, why waste time and money build up and test actual 1.0 when whatever they had already worked.

    2. Alexander LegisNonScriptae
      Alexander LegisNonScriptae
      Jaar geleden

      Thank you. Also, 12:41 Uncommanded nose-down trim. Several ladies have complimented me on that

    3. Knee Snap
      Knee Snap
      Jaar geleden

      @Alexander LegisNonScriptae you're not wrong...

    4. Alexander LegisNonScriptae
      Alexander LegisNonScriptae
      Jaar geleden

      People who work for corporations brainwash themselves.

    5. Knee Snap
      Knee Snap
      Jaar geleden

      @ped7g I'd almost guess that it has to have been a management failure. Unless they hired someone with no qualifications, the impacts of this are painfully clear. It's too insane to think it wasn't brought up somewhere, then dismissed.

  65. Thyandyr
    Thyandyr
    Jaar geleden

    Everything in US is about money and FAA is just a political plaything there to promote Boeing

    1. Merilix2
      Merilix2
      Jaar geleden

      @R Lyle Either you just didnt got the point of my post or my english isnt good enough for you. But thats fine. There are always two stories behind such accidents. An official report only shows one.

    2. R Lyle
      R Lyle
      Jaar geleden

      @Merilix2 Except you think they crashed their airplane on purpose." too idiotic of a statement to even read the rest of your "post". Read the report yourself

    3. Merilix2
      Merilix2
      Jaar geleden

      @R Lyle "Really?" Yes, really! Except you think they crashed their airplane on purpose. Such things are never ever pilot errors! I say this even if I consider the facts you mentioned. Appropriate training costs money, better maintenance costs money, etc... but established procedures have to consider humans behave like humans. Thats it. "pilot error" is the cheapest explanation so nothing has to be changend. Or has it? (same applies for other catastrophic accidents as well) PS: Just one aspect: Returning to the airport costs alot of money for the airline they were flying for. What do you know about how such events are handled internally? Eventually the pilots were under high pressure not to do so.

    4. R Lyle
      R Lyle
      Jaar geleden

      ​@Merilix2 Really? Here are some FACTS that apparently escaped your "research". They came from the official Indonesian crash report, not CNN. Aircraft had problems with the AOA sensors upon arrival the night before the crash that caused the flight to be so bad, passengers were described as “traumatized” Maintenance checks the aircraft and installs a used part that is defective. Maintenance has no proof that the appropriate tests were completed after the install other than a faked photograph. Maintenance releases the aircraft as airworthy when it CLEARLY is not. As an added bonus, there are thirty one pages MISSING from the aircraft maintenance log. Pilot and FO acknowledge AOA reading discrepancies BEFORE takeoff. TWO seconds into the flight the stick shaker goes off. The FO asks the Pilot if they should return to the airport. He apparently thought he could fix it in the air. The instrument readings are off by so much the FO contacts ATC TWICE to ask two questions; what is their altitude and speed. Ponder that. They don’t know how high or how fast they are going, YET THE PILOT STILL DOESN’T ATTEMPT TO RETURN TO THE AIRPORT. They continue the flight for over 13 minutes, never exceeding 6,000 feet, before crashing. The aircraft should have been at approximately 25,000 feet at that time. If maintenance had done their JOB, the aircraft never would have left the gate until it was CORRECTLY repaired. If the pilot did his JOB, he never would have left the ground, or would have immediately returned back to the airport which could have been done as the aircraft was under the max landing weight. The crash was caused by incompetent maintenance people and pilot error.

    5. Merilix2
      Merilix2
      Jaar geleden

      @R Lyle Such things are never pilot errors. they do what they learned to do according the information they have. too easy to say "pilot error" from the comfortable armchair perspective afterwards.

  66. Dr.Chris Keto
    Dr.Chris Keto
    Jaar geleden

    After recertification, airlines will have to provide new information for their flights regarding the type of aircraft on which the flight will be operated...

    1. Paul
      Paul
      Jaar geleden

      @Bob Evens Sometimes when I post to NLlike, there are double messages, something weird is happening so I have copied and pasted the text here.... By the way, I looked up your quote of the 1,500 hrs rule. I'll qualify this by stating that I am not a pilot, but are you are aware that this rule is only applicable to the USA and in order to qualify, one only needs to have clocked up those hours in any of the following ways. "There are many ways to achieve this 1500 hour requirement. Once you have your commercial pilot license you will be able to work for hire. This means you can start instructing, crop dusting, banner towing, flying tours, and so much more." So none of those accumulated hours need to have been in a 737. The figure of 207 hours for the first officer of ET302, Ahmed Nur Mohammod Nur, has been quoted many times, however he actually had 361 total logged hours on a variety of aircraft with 207 of them exclusively as an FO in the 737 meaning that he may well have had more practical 737 experience than a USA based FO who is just starting his career in that aircraft. While Lion Air is a budget airline (and I personally would never fly on any of them in ANY country, if not for safety), Ethiopian has a very good reputation and is a member of Star Alliance which has its own set of standards that member airlines must achieve, so it is not reasonable to make the same judgment as would apply to a budget line.

    2. Paul
      Paul
      Jaar geleden

      @Bob Evens I didn't remove my 1,500 hr rule comment, it is there just above your last comment.

    3. Paul
      Paul
      Jaar geleden

      @Bob Evens I think the level of the scandal is really quite clear with one of the leading media outlets being the Seattle Times (related stories - www.seattletimes.com/tag/737-max/ ). Doesn't matter what you claim about the airlines in question, it is clear beyond any doubt that Boeing knowingly cut corners on safety in an effort to sell a shoddy product into the market quickly to bolster share prices. Several months ago EASA made a list of five substantial changes that must happen if the MAX is ever to be allowed to fly again. This is not an airline problem - if it was the MAX would have been ungrounded many months ago. No, this is a failure by Boeing. With regard to maintenance are you talking about the replacement of an AoA sensor with one that had been serviced by a US company? While we're on that, remember that one of the prime causes of the incidents was Boeing's implementation of a single point of failure allowing the aircraft to become unflyable, while all other aircraft in this category use three sensors working in unison. It is clear from the thousands of comments on these types of videos that some people either have a soft spot for Boeing, or have money invested in their shares that makes them unreasonably defensive - there is not other way to explain the comments that are being made despite the evidence that is clearly available.

    4. Paul
      Paul
      Jaar geleden

      @Bob Evens FAA "rules" are not worth the paper they are written on.

  67. Luca Benelli
    Luca Benelli
    Jaar geleden

    Regarding the question about the 3rd AOA: I believe the paid option was the AOA indicator, which also had the side effect of enabling the AOA DISAGREE alert, which should have been a warning shown even without the AOA indicator...

    1. Sascha Haupt
      Sascha Haupt
      Jaar geleden

      The 737. has just 2 AoA sensors as the aircraft is a legacy design. The discussion about the 3th AoA sensor comes afaik from EASA. They consider making a 3th AoA sensor a mandatory requirement for a new airworthiness approval of the MAX.

    2. Sascha Haupt
      Sascha Haupt
      Jaar geleden

      @Luca Benelli There is a AoA Disagree function which should be a standard feature of the software. However, there was a buggy SW implementation which lead to the situation that the AoA Disagree function was just operable if the optional AoA Indicator was orderd by the customer. A fix for that issue was already on the was for the next SW upgrade. But the missing alarm function was not considered a safety issue. Therefore, they didn‘t rolled out the fix as a safety fix. Maybe, also an indication for an culture problem at Boing.

    3. Luca Benelli
      Luca Benelli
      Jaar geleden

      @kardy12 from what i read (sorry, don't remeber the source of this info) it wasn't supposed to be bound to the AOA indicator as it is a security feature.

    4. kardy12
      kardy12
      Jaar geleden

      Luca Benelli Indeed, this used to be standard on previous 737’s, but Boeing decided to make it an chargeable optional extra with the Max.

  68. Allard Freichmann
    Allard Freichmann
    Jaar geleden

    Another proof of USA corruption world wide. When will the peoples of the world wake up and pull their strength and powers? To fight against USA corruption? Together!

  69. Deano TheSaxman
    Deano TheSaxman
    Jaar geleden

    For those of you that want to see the Mentour Pilot Nose down MCAS situation in the Sim ... The below link is where it's at, Truely SHOCKING !!! nllike.info/baby/video/kqCAsYzPrXyg0ag

  70. ygg drasil
    ygg drasil
    Jaar geleden

    34:15 this certification process is exactly the same one that was used in Sydney for building certification and resulted in multiple structural failures of brand new high rise buildings.

  71. ygg drasil
    ygg drasil
    Jaar geleden

    It's like Boeing saw what happened to Airbus AF447 and said "Hey, let's do the exact opposite!"

  72. Muster Mann
    Muster Mann
    Jaar geleden

    Warum hält er seinen Vortrag in englisch und nicht auf deutsch ?

    1. Axel Vetter
      Axel Vetter
      Jaar geleden

      Ich war bei diesem Vortrag auf dem Kongress im Publikum. Ein großer Teil der Besucher dieser Veranstaltung stammte aus dem Ausland und sprach kein Deutsch.

    2. Alexander W.
      Alexander W.
      Jaar geleden

      @active285 Vom Kolonialismus profitiert die englischsprachige Welt bis heute. Dass Englisch die Weltsprache Nummer 1 ist, verdankt sich in der Hauptsache dieser gewaltsamen Expansion rund um den Globus. Deutsch ist übrigens keine "komische Sprache", sondern, neben Englisch, Italienisch und Französisch die prägendste Kultursprache des Abendlandes.

    3. active285
      active285
      Jaar geleden

      @Muster Mann Es ist also "traurig", dass er mit seiner sehr aufklärerischen Arbeit eine weltweite Zielgruppe erreichen möchte? Englisch hat sie durch diverse historische Zufälle und offenbar auch dank Ihrer Simplizität nun einmal durchgesetzt. Das kann man beweinen und beklagen, interessiert aber nicht, wenn man weltweit wissenschaftlich publizieren und Gehör erhalten möchte. Es gibt wenige Ausnahmen, wie die Philosophie oder andere Geisteswissenschaften, wo ich Ihnen gern zustimme. PS: Offenbar haben Sie noch nie wissenschaftlich in Frankreich gearbeitet. Franzosen haben zwar die Eigenart Vorträge ab und an immer noch gern in Französisch zu halten, ich habe aber seit Jahren keine in Französisch verfassten Slides mehr gesehen. Wer macht sich auch gern die Arbeit für jeden Vortrag außerhalb Frankreichs die kompletten Vortragsnotizen doppelt zu führen? Das führt zur skurrilen Situationen: Menschen referieren ihre in Englisch verfassten Slides 60min auf Französisch...

    4. Muster Mann
      Muster Mann
      Jaar geleden

      @active285 Wäre traurig, wenn das der Hauptgrund ist. Franzosen denken da ganz anders. Entweder du hälst deinen Vortrag auf Landessprache, oder du wirst ignoriert. Eine Eigenschaft, welche so manchem abhanden gekommen ist. Schade, dass für dich Deutsch komisch ist.

    5. active285
      active285
      Jaar geleden

      Wahrscheinlich, damit er eine größere Reichweite erreicht? Immerhin spricht nur ein verschwindend kleiner Teil der Menschheit unserer komische Sprache...

  73. william forwell
    william forwell
    Jaar geleden

    I fully endorse female pilots however looking at the video where they had to abandon the simulator you can see even the captain was struggling To keep control of the yoke while the copilot could not get enough leverage to bring the simulated aircraft under control

  74. Alexander W.
    Alexander W.
    Jaar geleden

    The speaker's mother language is German?

    1. Renato Stiefenhofer
      Renato Stiefenhofer
      Jaar geleden

      @Zhi Han Lee All Ethiopian Air pilots received a bulletin from Boeing to follow the checklist given (november, 6th, 2018). This was about five months before the crash. The trim runaway stabilizer checklist calls first for electric trim use to stabilize the aircraft and neutralize the control column pitch forces. Then you cut off the hydraulics and use manual trim. The aircraft was way too fast to trim the stabilizer manually. It was daylight and good weather, the pilot should have been able to see that they were way to fast by simply looking outside the window. Instead the captain tried several times to engage the autopilot (which is pointless when your speed indicator goes up and down, stickshaker rattling..). This crew was very inexperienced, to say the least. The MCAS was lousy, too. Tsai tien.

    2. Zhi Han Lee
      Zhi Han Lee
      Jaar geleden

      @Renato Stiefenhofer While reducing thrust would likely have helped to a certain extent I thought the trim runaway checklist prescribes switching off the electric trim (as it is linked of MCAS)

    3. Renato Stiefenhofer
      Renato Stiefenhofer
      Jaar geleden

      @Zhi Han Lee you can't manually trim at exessive airspeeds. Too much airloads on the surfaces. The electric trim worked. He was just overwhelmed by the situation. He should have reduced thrust. He was not flying his aircraft.

    4. Zhi Han Lee
      Zhi Han Lee
      Jaar geleden

      @Renato Stiefenhofer I remembered the Ethiopian pilots re-engaged the hydraulics only after they'd tried to manually trim the aircraft but found the trim wheel too hard to turn

    5. T K K
      T K K
      Jaar geleden

      Yeah, so Boeing are stupid for admitting their mistake but you are the stable genius. Okay buddy, nobody believes you. Look for someone else to fool

  75. granskare
    granskare
    Jaar geleden

    an FAA guy, Ali Bahrami was helpful to Boeing.

  76. granskare
    granskare
    Jaar geleden

    it appears to me that Boeing charged for each thing, etc,

  77. Andrew Volyanyuk
    Andrew Volyanyuk
    Jaar geleden

    PLEASE READ CAREFULLY: There were actually three accidents with 737-MAX planes. The first one happened with the same Lion Air plane that crashed the very next day. It was due to the same malfunction but pilots were able to safely land the plane. You ask why? Because they have taken right actions from the QRH (Quick Reference HandBook). THOSE ACTIONS HAVE TO BE DONE BY PILOTS BY MEMORY. In both cases the Indicated Airspeed Disagree warning would be on the IAS screen. So pilots have to do steps to determine which display is showing the right speed. Why is this important? Because AOA (angle of attack sensor) is a source that is also taken into account for IAS indication. Also, when there is an UNCOMMANDED STABILIZER TRIM MOVEMENT - there is a section of QRH that must be done by memory : UNCOMMENDED STABILIZER TRIM MOVEMENT OCCURS CONTINIOUSLY. It has 5 simple steps that pilots should do to continue safe and controlled flight. As you show Logs from flight data recordes, all that pilots did was just pulling on the yoke as hard as they could for a very long period of time until the plane crashed. They have not done any actions from the QRH what so ever. I want to point out, that this situation of uncommanded stabilizer trim movement can occur not only on MAX airplanes due to its MCAS system. It can occur on any 737 plane. So that is why it was in the QRH FROM THE VERY BEGINNING OF 737 OPERATION. AND PILOTS HAVE TO KNOW THESE STEPS. THE QUESTION OF THE PILOTS TRAININGS AND HOW THEY PASS EXAMS AND HOW THEY OPERATE AN AIRCRAFT IN MANUAL FLIGHTS IS A BIG ONE. THESE FATAL ACCIDENTS WOULD NOT HAPPEN IF PILOTS KNEW WHAT TO DO.

    1. lee x
      lee x
      Jaar geleden

      @Andrew Volyanyuk i do typically get it's "Boeing fault responses" when I try and place some blame on the pilots, that these planes crashed witch I agree boeing definitely contributed to the crashes by introducing a runaway trim fault at low altitude But the pilots did not react at all to the runaway trim (or after 45 seconds on second one and even then they switched it back on witch resulted in final Dive witch should have been technically pilot error for restring power to faulty powered trim system) so this shows there is a problem with some pilot training with runaway trim (heavy sticks is typically incorrectly set trim and if it keeps doing uncommanded down trims when your pressing up trim you cut it because something has gone faulty to cause the runaway trim you don't ignore and it its not your problem to fix it in the air) Other issues seem to go on from some pilots might be panicked a bit from one stick Shaker going active on one side witch may have distracted them , from What I have read both flights they could see right away that there AOA and air speed was Not matching so they knew they had faulty AOA even without having the AOA miss match indicator light or angle position indicator I don't know I just believe it was avoidable crashs especially the first one as they was countering MCAS for over 6 minutes by pressing the up trim button and never considered to cutting trim power even though they knew it was causing the problem Any system that controls flight surfaces and power systems have to be classed as flight critical no matter how minor the system was supposed to be and this is how MCAS was allowed to pass because they called it as not critical

    2. Andrew Volyanyuk
      Andrew Volyanyuk
      Jaar geleden

      lee x well I agree with you. It is pleasure to talk to you since you know things about aircraft and as far as I see different videos on NLlike , people in most cases dont know nothing about what they say. It seems like they just got random phrases from different ( always unreliable ) sources and try to broadcast their poor knowledge.

    3. lee x
      lee x
      Jaar geleden

      @Andrew Volyanyuk i have watched a number of these crash reports when just dropping to alternate law mode was enough for them to crash the plane (because the way the joystick reacts are different and flight limits are set to maximum witch can result in a crash, in direct mode all safety's are removed and you as it states you have direct control of the flight surfaces) that is the problem with Airbus is between normal mode alternate and Direct the plane does not fly the same way and unknown amount of pilots may not be doing off books training (some pilots have a flight sim at home just so they can brush up on procedures and rare emergencies like runaway trim or in Airbus flying alternate or direct mode which is not permitted when you're flying commercially as most airliners do not permit you to fly the plane in alternate law mode so when an emergency does happen some pilots just don't know how to fly the plane correctly when they drop to alternate law) where as the Boeing plane once you turn off the autopilot for all intents purposes you are the one flying the plane even on the Boeing 777 or the 787 Dreamliner the plane will react similarly to as if you was flying a hydraulic stick type plane (baring damage) until some goofs at Boeing approved a program with no failsafes to control critical flight surfaces (in this case trim) witch unfortunately displayed pilots not reacting as expected to runaway trim quickly It would have been interesting if this was not related to the MCAS but say a faulty trim wheel power and the pilots failed to kill the power would that have still been Boeing fault if the pilots did not disconnect the trim power (witch they never did in first crash, they didn't even try) The Airbus air France crash still reminds me how stupid someone can be allowed to fly a plane (and why not having force feedback joysticks is bad) the Co pilot (bowin) panicked after the speed tubes got blocked temporarily and plane dropped into alternate law (witch he never flew in before) so autopilot disabled and your supposed to just keep to your same heading with a slight up angle until the speed tubes defrost, unfortunately because of alternate law bowin wasn't telling the plane to do a slight pull up he was telling the computer to goto maximum up pitch angle (never told other pilot) so now speed tubes have cleared and stall warning is active engines have now automatically gone to full speed and they are now in a airodynamic stall so they are still flying but falling at same time (as the alternate law was preventing the plane from going into a full-on stall but it was letting the plane go into a sliding install) the left pilot trys to push control forward but due to other pilot pulling back the plane slowly pitches down so he stopped (controls are in avg mode left side never taken primary control) the captain now comes into the cabin and says what's going on, left pilot says we lost control of plane (captain sees virtual hud is showing high up pitch angle when they are stalling and should be pushing down) bowin then says he has been pulling back the whole time, captain says then push forward push forward but at that point it was to late they didn't have enough altitude to recover enough speed which the captain fully well knew at that point about 10 seconds later they belly flopped into the water was so sad reading the translated recording the last words was from Bowin with him saying a words of ?? confusion of how he didn't know he just killed everyone on the plane by failing to understand basic flying completely (pulling back when stalling) I wish the captain on the flight cockpit recorder had said you just killed us all (bowin at no point until the near end of the crash never said he was pulling back) the problem was in normal mode for him pulling back tells the plane to fly up higher (it does all the calculations automatically within far from limits) but in alternate law mode pulling back on the stick tells the plane to "pitch up" and let's the plane gets to its programed limits The stupid thing is if both pilots had let go of the controls with the autopilot disabled the plane should have automatically gone to flight Level (unless they had locked the angle) like the 787 does when you let go of the controls with no autopilot

    4. Andrew Volyanyuk
      Andrew Volyanyuk
      Jaar geleden

      lee x I completely agree with you. You mentioned a very clever statement! Boeing should have done it more clearly about how this system operates but the un-ability of pilots to quickly determine what is actually happening with an airplane is a big problem. Also another good example is the recent crash of a SuperJet in Moscow. When after a lightning strike the aircraft NORMAL CONTROL MODE was unavailable and pilots had to fly it in Direct mode. Which turned out that they didn't know actually how to correctly handle an aircraft in this mode. It resulted in many people deaths and fatal airplane damage.

    5. lee x
      lee x
      Jaar geleden

      Correction the first near crash was prevented due to a 3rd pilot in the jump seat the other 2 who were actually flying the plane did not take runaway trim action until the 3rd pilot had pointed it out (it probably would of crashed if the 3rd pilot was not there) I understand why Boeing standing internally it was pilot error as they failed to follow runaway procedures, but they should have given more details on how to stop the error by setting flaps to any position that isn't retracted but also these pilots was not reacting to a runaway trim quickly enough even the second crash the captain called for stab train after 45 seconds the problem started because they just kept pressing the up trim button and then the trim would start going back down for when that happened they should have stabbed the trim and disconnected the power before it got too bad (could you imagine what happened if it was a faulty motor and it was just constantly trimming down and waited 40 seconds to disconnect the trim power quite sure the plane would have gone full nose down after 20 seconds) There's a reason why the runaway trim procedure is a memory item because the trim can and will crash the plane if you let it, and its very clear from these two crashes and the possible one before the first crash that pilots and not been trained correctly for these situations when the stakes are getting heavy the trim up doesn't work when sticks are getting heavy, you cut the power it's that simple that's how USA and uk/EU (more native English) pilots do it when it happens and they don't go all panicky when one of the Stick shakers go active (as stick shaker is independently connected to one side so faulty AOA ony sets off one side only)

  78. Jonny Bravo
    Jonny Bravo
    Jaar geleden

    So sad especially considering that they could just have installed 2 simple systems once considered essential.. i fear all this “fixing the Max”, as much as it is necessary now, is just like barking at the wrong tree and in the big scheme of things is not going to fix anything.

  79. Jack Rainbow
    Jack Rainbow
    Jaar geleden

    Compare the emergency thrust/climb settings on the Max 8 with those for the NG. This is why I say the NG is inherently unstable.

    1. 10 9
      10 9
      Jaar geleden

      What do you mean?

  80. Solomon Pratt
    Solomon Pratt
    Jaar geleden

    Boeing 737 Max has been going on now for some time now, I believe everyone now knows the problem and will teach all plan makers that any new technology should be made available to all pilots during training

  81. Ralph Macchiato
    Ralph Macchiato
    Jaar geleden

    The Boeing flying coffin system™

    1. Alexander LegisNonScriptae
      Alexander LegisNonScriptae
      Jaar geleden

      Niess. And, saves on funeral expenses after all

  82. Ian Lang
    Ian Lang
    Jaar geleden

    From what was said here, it wasn't a software reliability problem; it was a design issue. The software functioned as it was written to function. But whoever specified the MCAS software didn't understand enough about the system (a passenger aircraft) in which it was supposed to work nor, to my mind, the function of the existing software with which, apparently, it was meant to inter-work. Testing wouldn't have identified the problem. Thorough review might have done. I'm surprised that nobody even asked what would happen if both sensors disagreed. Even the tea lady would have thought of that! Or whether giving such a system full authority over the stabiliser was really a good idea. To me, those are obvious questions that would almost certainly have been asked had the information been properly presented at a review. Another problem that is readily apparent from the black box traces is that both sensors were working but one had somehow been initialised with a static offset. That looks to me like a boot issue in the sensor itself, possibly another software error. Maybe the aircraft was parked in a windy spot during power-up and the sensor was flapping about during the boot and nobody had ever thought of that. Who knows? It could have even been a grub screw that had come loose - although I'm sure that mechanically, it was better constructed than that. Nevertheless, somebody missed another failure mode during the design. And anyway, if it had been mis-calibrated since boot, the system should have reported it before flight and the system turned off automatically. If the two sensors had diverged during flight to such a large degree, the system should have reported that too and turned itself off. Again, these are design errors. Really good engineers don't grow on trees though. Moreover, people change jobs and designs get farmed out to other teams or across multiple teams. The engineers who pick up the work have a much harder time understanding the system than the original designers. Sometimes even, people are not forthcoming with information that they regard as their own domain. I suspect the trim system was legacy code and not so well understood as it should have been.

  83. corryvreckan
    corryvreckan
    Jaar geleden

    superb talk

  84. pat B
    pat B
    Jaar geleden

    wow, understanding what has happened during the certification is an economical crime. Boeing showed false information to the FAA with the objective that they had a fast marked introduction being able to compeet with the Airbus A320 Neo, were Airbus has donated the correct information and did all the required safety checks. This is an economical crime.

  85. Marián Markovič
    Marián Markovič
    Jaar geleden

    48:00 if they decidet to use data from both sensors it would indicate that NCAS is criticall system and they wouldnt be able to certificate MAX as upgrade as they wanted,... managment-made decision.

    1. Renato Stiefenhofer
      Renato Stiefenhofer
      Jaar geleden

      @T K K Racist? Really? Snowflake?

    2. T K K
      T K K
      Jaar geleden

      You are just racist. Boeing has admitted their mistake so you have no basis to spew your nonsense here.

    3. Renato Stiefenhofer
      Renato Stiefenhofer
      Jaar geleden

      Incredible nonsense of this german small aircraft PPL holder. He is not a jet pilot, not even a copilot. It's not the 737-MAX. It's the complacent and poorly trained pilots. The pilots were lousy, on both crashes. I am saying this as a current 747-8 captain / instructor and former 737 captain. The Ethiopian Air captain was a 29-year old rookie with less than 500 landings under his belt. He had only about 1'400 hours as a captain. He spent over 6'000 hours in the right, the co-pilot's seat of widebodies 787and 777 where his captains gave him a landing or two per month. He was mainly the radio operator. This inexperienced captain never touched the throttles after V1. He crashed his airplane with high thrust (94% N1) an at high speed during excellent daylight weather conditions into the ethiopian ground. He was unable to trim his aircraft because he was flying way too fast. No trim can be operated at excessive speeds. His copilot was a pedestrian. He had a total of a mere 261 hours. He just finished training... from a Cessna to the 737. Ethiopian Airlines scheduling is obviously very unprofessional. The captain tried to engage the autopilot several times instead of flying his aircraft. He re-engaged the hydraulics against the checklist! Big mistake. He did not understand his airplane. Lousy training and no situational awareness. The 737 MCAS was not perfect, no doubt. But the main reason for both 737-MAX crashed were poor airmanship. I am saying this as a pilot. As I said and you can google him: this german presenter is clueless. He flies small single engined four seater airplanes for fun. He is not a professional pilot. He may have a PhD in engineering and I am sure he knows a lot about that but he does not understand how to fly a jet. His presentation was very unprofessional, too. A waste of time.

    4. Chris Richter
      Chris Richter
      Jaar geleden

      @Alexander LegisNonScriptae You would because you would have been able to identify the mailfunction from one of the sensors and you would have been able to prevent the crash.

    5. Marián Markovič
      Marián Markovič
      Jaar geleden

      @Alexander LegisNonScriptae www.theguardian.com/business/2020/jan/09/boeing-737-max-internal-messages

  86. Samai Pata
    Samai Pata
    Jaar geleden

    And the moral of this story is? IF THE COMPUTER GOES DOWN - YOU GO DOWN!

  87. Schei MJ
    Schei MJ
    Jaar geleden

    39:35 This is incorrect. 10 seconds of uncommanded trim should be recognized as runaway stab trim by any competent pilot and should be suspicious. This is especially true when it keeps happening multiple times, over and over and over again. More than 10 times in these cases. Each 10 second activation is enough to make the flight controls alarmingly heavy towards the nose down position.

    1. lee x
      lee x
      Jaar geleden

      Especially if its doing it for over 6 minutes (first crash) maximum engine power and they never considered to stab trim power second crash the captain did request trim stab and they did do it but because engine power was still at take off power and he waited 40 seconds after the runaway trim Started it was practically impossible to turn the trim Wheel By hand with 1 person (so they switched trim power back on witch resulted on final dive and crash) You should be recognising a runaway trim within 10 to 15 seconds as it can will crash your plane if you let a trim continuously down trim or up trim your plane

  88. tiffsaver
    tiffsaver
    Jaar geleden

    This was the single best explanation of the this air disaster I've ever seen. It illustrates the massive importance of hiring OUTSIDE, INDEPENDENT PROFESSIONAL INVESTIGATORS to handle these issues, NOT the laughable FAA, who this man has already described as "not having enough engineers" to even begin to deal with the scope of this accident, not to mention their criminal collusion in allowing Boeing executives to police themselves, then put deadlines and "cost cutting measures" ahead of passenger safety. One more thing. In my opinion, there is something inherently terrifying in allowing COMPUTERS ALONE TO CONTROL EVERY, SINGLE ASPECT OF AN AIRPLANE'S OPERATION. Where is the "backup" is anything should go wrong, which it inevitably does?? Computers can break down, computers can malfunction, computers can be hacked, and computers are never perfect, *and will never be.* This entire scenario reminds me of six landmark motion pictures that tried to warn us of dangers of total reliance on electronic technology: 1) *On The Beach* both versions (Computers accidentally start WWIII) 2) *2001: A Space Odyssey* (Computer takes over all ship operations, kills entire crew) 3) *Fail Safe* (US Air Force's "fail-proof" computer system accidentally experiences a glitch, triggers nuclear attack against Russia) 4) *Dr. Strangelove: Or How I Stopped Worrying and Learned to Love the Bomb* (Ditto) 5) *The Terminator* (Computer system become self aware, destroys all human beings on earth) 6) *The Minority Report* (Computer that can predict crimes before they happen ("Pre-Crime") malfunctions and accuses an innocent man of murder-kind of like Trump's recent assassination of Iran's top general) Does anyone see a pattern here??? Here is my prediction. ULTIMATELY, COMPUTERS WILL BE THE DOWNFALL OF MANKIND... PERIOD. And just one more little post script: If just one more new Boeing aircraft, regardless of model, falls out of the sky, it will bankrupt millions of American workers and their associated companies, clearing the way for Airbus to become the single most recognized leader in commercial aircraft manufacturing, worldwide.

    1. David Cooper
      David Cooper
      Jaar geleden

      @tiffsaver We see this from different perspectives. Yes there is an inherent problem in changing the engine position but I dont see it as much of an issue as you do. It will work as proven by the thousand of safe max flights previously. Safety was compromised with the way Boeing handled the software testing and allowed that version MCAS into production largely untested (and yes with one vane). My point about some error with Lion air is that it was unfortunate that the event occurred with a budget airline. Even the Indonesian authorities could see that. They must take some of the blame. There is material you can watch on youtube giving an account of how the aircraft was used repeatedly in fault condition on previous flights. They compromised the safety of their passengers and pilots. Im sorry if you think im being judgemental but it is documented. Perhaps the A320 330 and 350 380 airbuses should not be flying either as they are completely controlled by software and computers with no alternate means of fying the plane. I will leave it here. I dont want to argue any more.

    2. tiffsaver
      tiffsaver
      Jaar geleden

      @David Cooper Then why did you conspicuously fail to mention the lethal MCAS trim system, the shoddy manufacturing at Boeing, the single sensor issue, or even the new, oversized engines THAT CAUSED THE ACCIDENTS IN THE FIRST PLACE?? The fact is, they ALREADY KNOW what caused these two fatal crashes, they just don't know how to FIX it!! The way you so subtly blamed the pilots and possible maintenance issues in these identical cases was quite pitiful... beyond poor taste.

    3. David Cooper
      David Cooper
      Jaar geleden

      @tiffsaver Lol. I must sound like one 😊 But no. I guess we will have to wait and see what the final max looks like when it eventually takes off.

    4. tiffsaver
      tiffsaver
      Jaar geleden

      @David Cooper I have only one question for you. ARE YOU A SHILL FOR BOEING??? Faulty maintenance and pilot training has already been investigated!! Do you actually believe that Boeing would allow its ENTIRE INVENTORY of new planes grounded, worldwide, if these two fatal crashes weren't caused by INHERENT DESIGN FLAWS?? Time to take a reality pill, my friend.

    5. David Cooper
      David Cooper
      Jaar geleden

      @tiffsaver re max 8 going back into service. Good question. There is certainly a lack of trust out there by governments, airlines and the public

  89. tiffsaver
    tiffsaver
    Jaar geleden

    Of this entire lecture, the one part that disturbed me the most was the simulator cockpit scene, where the pilot was trying to control the yoke, locked in a death grip, while his co-pilot fought the trim stabilizer with all this strength, with disastrous results. AND THIS WAS JUST A SIMULATION!! When I tried to imagine what the entire flight crew and hundreds of passengers much have gone through just prior to impact, it put a chill through my body like nothing I have had experienced during this entire investigation. When Ethiopia slammed into the ground, the bodies were shredded into pieces small enough to place in a band aid box, and the metal aircraft was reduced to pieces averaging the size of a loaf of bread. I didn't even think it was possible for a brand-new commercial aircraft to undergo such total devastation. That is why I believe all Boeing executives should be in prison right now, for Criminal Negligence. They knew of the myriad dangers of the Max 8, LONG before the double crashes. They even FIRED their own line managers when they reported the dangerous conditions on the assembly line, or sent them the actual emails from Max pilots who complained of the dangerous control problems inherent with the new, untested system. Damn them all.

    1. tiffsaver
      tiffsaver
      Jaar geleden

      @Bob Evens First of all, genius, if you lose 100% of your hydraulics, unless you can utilize the thrust of your engines ONLY to safely get down, you're already dead. I just love it when an idiot like you distorts my comments to the point of lunacy. My comment was to a guy who thought that only "male pilots" possessed the necessary strength to properly and safely control any commercial aircraft with "brute strength." If females couldn't handle ANY emergency circumstance that could occur in flight, they would never even qualify to get their wings. But leave it to a moron like yourself not to understand a reply that even a 5-year old girl would understand. Don't ever contact me again. P.S. And read my last post again, you belligerent dickhead. NO AMOUNT OF 'BRUTE FORCE' WOULD HAVE EVER SAVED EITHER OF THESE TWO BOEING MAX 8'S, rendering your statements even more blatantly stupid.

    2. tiffsaver
      tiffsaver
      Jaar geleden

      @Earlchaos I believe that on at least one aircraft, they even tried that and it didn't work. That's why the entire MCAS system was just an accident waiting to happen.

    3. Earlchaos
      Earlchaos
      Jaar geleden

      He actually told in the talk - the harder the pilots try the worse it will become. They could've switched off the automated stabilisation but weren't trained for it.

    4. Stefan
      Stefan
      Jaar geleden

      Well, in a situation like this, i hope they will ditch the security and bring in a guy from the cabin to help turning. Yes, it would be a tight fit and against protocol... But i am sure crashing is pretty bad too 🤷🏼‍♂️

    5. tiffsaver
      tiffsaver
      Jaar geleden

      @william forwell "Brute force" should NEVER be necessary in any kind of operational aircraft, especially with a multi million-dollar commercial aircraft. And I know of at least a half dozen women who could beat you in an arm wrestling contest. This incident had nothing at all to do with physical strength. Arnold Schwarzenegger couldn't have saved this airplane.

  90. Mark Smith
    Mark Smith
    Jaar geleden

    Interesting talk, thanks! My question, from a pilots viewpoint, is regarding what is revealed at 14:15. Essentially the pilots were periodically using electric trim to trim nose up, which stops the mcas and returns the stab trim to a normal position. This seemed to be working fine for a while, so why did they seem to give up and just allow the mcas to trim all the way nose down? I know it's all too easy for me to criticise from the comfort of an armchair, but I can't see why I wouldn't keep trimming the aircraft nose up if I was having trouble holding the nose up with the control column.

    1. Adamast
      Adamast
      Jaar geleden

      I heard somewhere that the trim motor could have overheated in the end

    2. Sokeresa
      Sokeresa
      Jaar geleden

      @Mark Smith good point there. My best guess is the pilots were not aware of the existence of MCAS

    3. Mark Smith
      Mark Smith
      Jaar geleden

      @Andrew Burns I understand that, but for a while the pilots were successfully using the electric trim to stop mcas. The mcas is interrupted by use of electric trim, it then waits for the trim switch to be released, waits a few seconds more and reactivates. This explains why they needed to repeatedly use electric trim, but not why their inputs suddenly became shorter and less frequent - no longer sufficient to counter the mcas.

    4. Andrew Burns
      Andrew Burns
      Jaar geleden

      Specifically MCAS has control for a period and then reverts to pilot control for a very short period (I believe it is 20s/10s but don’t quote me. Also: > A manual trim wheel is provided, but is not powerful enough to adjust the stabilizer in all flight conditions. Activating the powered trim system can be necessary and this also activates the MCAS. The flight control surfaces are so big on modern airliners it is impractical (if not impossible) to manually adjust them during normal flight.

    5. Ian Lang
      Ian Lang
      Jaar geleden

      Most problably because they ran out of trim. As herr Sieker said in the presentation, the MCAS had far greater authority than the trim.

  91. Jzero
    Jzero
    Jaar geleden

    People seem to think the FAA failed to act and fix the problem when they were in fact the problem. The 737MAX is just as great of a plane as its 737 parent. The only small difference is due to the change in engine design. This caused extra lift at low speeds and high angles of attack. This difference can could have been sorted out by an extra hour or two in the simulator. However, the FAA has strict rules on type ratings which follow bureaucratic lines rather than reality. Boeing could not realistically expect its customers to retrain for an unnecessary type rating. So the MCAS system was implemented to automatically adjust for this change. It was the unnecessary MCAS system that brought down the plans (along with a high degree of pilot error). This was a system that the FAA forced Boeing to implement. Boeing is one of the safety conscious airplane makers out there. Their experts chose not to implement an MCAS system in their aircraft for a reason. It was the bureaucrats in the FAA who are not experts in anything besides paperwork that implemented the flawed system. Had the FAA not been involved, none of these crashes would have happened.

    1. RG
      RG
      Jaar geleden

      So if someone will tell you to jump from the roof you will jump from the roof? Are you are saying here is that FAA forced Boeing to implement MCAS and Boeing "Jumped from the roof"?

  92. Trevor Austin
    Trevor Austin
    Jaar geleden

    And let us also remember that there is another killer fitted to aircraft. The pitch trim system. Aircraft trim systems will constantly provide an increasing nose-up trim even when the aircraft is flown below “bugged” (desired) speed. Why? What is the use of having an aircraft properly trimmed below desired speed. Pilots are told that this is to prevent the autopilot from being overloaded and dropping out. This means that if an aircraft aircraft is flown with the A/P on an ILS at idle power [a glideslope intercept at a speed above desired speed?] without autothrottle the aircraft will constantly trim nose up until it runs out of trim. Then the A/P fails. You are now very close to the ground and have to recover, possibly from a stall - with full nose up trim. Boeing manuals now very kindly tell you that full power may prevent stall recovery - because some idiot thought it important the the autopilot remains engaged! This pointless feature is within MOST aircraft.

  93. David Cooper
    David Cooper
    Jaar geleden

    The last question was the most poignant of all in my view. Earlier, Bernd explained that there is not enough time or resources to test any software fully to the point of achieving an insignificant risk status where the software affects flight control. The early iterations of the airbus software must surely have been in the same position as Boeing in that they had to be put into service at some point that was still less than the millions of hours recommended. (However, the longer the Airbus computers are in the air the more in-service software testing and proving is achieved.) The difference being that Boeing obviously handled the testing phase badly. Despite Airbus' best efforts, Qantas almost lost an A330 over Western Australia after a software bug occurred and was subsequently rectified I believe. Note. I have since heard this is not confirmed and far more likely to be a hardware issue

    1. David Cooper
      David Cooper
      Jaar geleden

      @Paul wow thankyou. I stand corrected. I read a report summary but obviously missed much of the finer details contained in the final report.

    2. Paul
      Paul
      Jaar geleden

      Not correct there. The "software bug" you are referring to was actually suspected to have been a hardware fault in the ADIRU manufactured by the USA's Northrop-Grumman. This was not an issue created by Airbus. The final report stated, "After detailed forensic analysis of the FDR, the FCPC software, and the ADIRU, it was determined that the CPU of the ADIRU corrupted the angle of attack (AOA) data. A number of potential trigger types were investigated, including software bugs, software corruption, hardware faults, electromagnetic interference and the secondary high energy particles generated by cosmic rays. Although a definitive conclusion could not be reached, there was sufficient information from multiple sources to conclude that most of the potential triggers were very unlikely to have been involved. *A much more likely scenario was that a marginal hardware weakness of some form* made the Northrop-Grumman ADIRU units susceptible to the effects of some type of environmental factor, which triggered the failure mode."

  94. antichris
    antichris
    Jaar geleden

    "Best/fastest-selling", "cheap(er)", "expensive", "paid by". The profit-oriented capitalism sucks. Could not shake that feeling that through this entire talk. Obviously someone figured to cheap out on software engineering, hiring code monkeys to do code design instead software engineers, which would have been a more expensive (both financially and temporally) and less profitable option. I recall reading somewhere that corporations are a form of artificial life, intelligence even - they exist at all only to ensure their own perpetuation. With the secondary goal of maximizing profit (pretty much just like living organisms have feeding as a secondary goal that only serves continuation of the species). Everything and everyone else are collateral, immaterial, when not profitable. That includes employees, board members and investors; clients, customers and innocent bystanders; the environment, the global climate and any and all natural resources, which pains me the most.

  95. Renato Stiefenhofer
    Renato Stiefenhofer
    Jaar geleden

    Incredible nonsense of this german small aircraft PPL holder. He is not a jet pilot, not even a copilot. It's not the 737-MAX. It's the complacent and poorly trained pilots. The pilots were lousy, on both crashes. I am saying this as a current 747-8 captain / instructor and former 737 captain. The Ethiopian Air captain was a 29-year old rookie with less than 500 landings under his belt. He had only about 1'400 hours as a captain. He spent over 6'000 hours in the right, the co-pilot's seat of widebodies 787and 777 where his captains gave him a landing or two per month. He was mainly the radio operator. This inexperienced captain never touched the throttles after V1. He crashed his airplane with high thrust (94% N1) an at high speed during excellent daylight weather conditions into the ethiopian ground. He was unable to trim his aircraft because he was flying way too fast. No trim can be operated at excessive speeds. His copilot was a pedestrian. He had a total of a mere 261 hours. He just finished training... from a Cessna to the 737. Ethiopian Airlines scheduling is obviously very unprofessional. The captain tried to engage the autopilot several times instead of flying his aircraft. He re-engaged the hydraulics against the checklist! Big mistake. He did not understand his airplane. Lousy training and no situational awareness. The 737 MCAS was not perfect, no doubt. But the main reason for both 737-MAX crashed were poor airmanship. I am saying this as a pilot. As I said and you can google him: this german presenter is clueless. He flies small single engined four seater airplanes for fun. He is not a professional pilot. He may have a PhD in engineering and I am sure he knows a lot about that but he does not understand how to fly a jet. His presentation was very unprofessional, too. A waste of time.

  96. AKAtheA
    AKAtheA
    Jaar geleden

    soooo, with the Dreamliner batteries being in an armored box, would that not negate any weight savings of using lithium cobalt chem?

    1. lee x
      lee x
      Jaar geleden

      Yep it was a bit of a fail really, trying to make ultra high dense battery but having to make a container that last long enough to not melt in event of fire the problem was with the Battery on the 787 dreamliner they was made in a way if 1 battery cell failed it would cascade into the other Battery cell and so on, if you look at the battery they look like they have a lot of space but they are stacked on top of each other so any failure of one cell would propagate into the other cells very rapidly as they were not isolated so that one cell failing will cause a cascade effect on the other cells (placing them Sideways probably would of resolved it as the failed cell would have simply melted and dropped out and just smouldered on the base of the battery unit not affecting the other cells)

    2. BamBamBatMan
      BamBamBatMan
      Jaar geleden

      AKAtheA , no

  97. mdesm2005
    mdesm2005
    Jaar geleden

    The author's answer to the last question is melo dramatic and hurts his credibility.. The MAX had a simple problem with a simple solution which has now been implemented. The problem was lack of redundant source of AOA data. MCAS would have disconnected if it had seen the mismatch in the two AOA sources. The design has been fixed.

  98. D Burton
    D Burton
    Jaar geleden

    If the FAA had been doing their job, this never would have come to pass. Just like the rest of our government, the FAA has been bribed ( paid off ) to sign off on the certification of this aircraft. Another disgrace brought to you by the US government.It just never ends, such a disgrace.......

  99. miketel01
    miketel01
    Jaar geleden

    Seems to be a European biased attitude in this talk. Room full of Airbus lovers. However, Exactly thank you. Poorly trained pilots and safety records were factors. The lion air plane did have outstanding maintenance issues prior to the crash as well

    1. Sokeresa
      Sokeresa
      Jaar geleden

      It was a brand new plane, wtf are you talking about outstanding maintenance issues....?!? HELLOOOOOOOOO I WAS A BOEING LOVER, NOW I'M LIKE A HEARTBROKEN BITCH OUT FOR REVENGE

  100. Alan Jorgensen
    Alan Jorgensen
    Jaar geleden

    I found this an interesting talk. I have questions that were not answered in the talk: Was the MCAS software subject to stress testing? Examples: Speeding up the system clock until failure and subsequent failure analysis (a la Tiavor Kuroma below); reducing available main storage until failure, code fault injection, etc. No where have I been able to verify that the MCAS software does NOT use floating point. Floating point is subject to serious error when input data is imprecise and it is unlikely that the A/D conversion of the AOA sensor data is of the same precision of any floating point operations on that data. Does the MCAS software use floating point? Can anyone answer these questions?

    1. mendel
      mendel
      Jaar geleden

      I doubt that the number representation had any impact: you are looking at a mechanical wind vane that measures the angle of attack with very limited precision, and the computations performed on it are not recursive in nature, so the errors wouldn't add up.